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Moore: Florida Constitutional Law: Disregarding the Florida Constitution

CASE COMMENTS
FLORIDA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: DISREGARDING
THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION'S INDEPENDENT
PROHIBITION AGAINST "UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT"
Jones v. State, 701 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1997)
Michael G. Moore*
Respondent, the State of Florida, sentenced Petitioner' to death2 by
electrocution.3 Petitioner claimed that execution by electrocution was
"unconstitutional per se."4 Furthermore, Petitioner contended that the
administration of his death sentence would constitute "cruel or unusual"
punishment based on reports that Florida's electric chair had malfunctioned
during the course of a recent execution.' The Supreme Court of Florida,
exercising all writs jurisdiction,6 stayed Petitioner's execution7 and called
for an evidentiary hearing to determine the present condition ofthe electric
* This Case Comment is dedicated to Jennifer.
1. See Jones v. State, 701 So. 2d 76, 76 (Fla. 1997) (per curiam) (four to three decision).
2. See id. (stating that Petitioner "was under warrant of death"). The court did not reveal
any details, or provide a description, of the crime itself. See id. However, it can be inferred that
Petitioner was convicted of a capital felony pursuant to the Florida Statutes. See FLA. STAT. §
775.082 (1995) (stating, in relevant part, that "[a] person who has been convicted of a capital
felony shall be punished by death").
3. See FLA. STAT. § 922. 10 (Supp. 1996) (stating, in relevant part, that "[a] death sentence
shall be executed by electrocution") (emphasis added).
4. Jones v. Butterworth, 691 So. 2d 481, 482 (Fla. 1997) [hereinafter Jones I].
Compare
Jones, 701 So. 2d at 76 (stating that Petitioner argued "execution per se [was] cruel and unusual
punishment") (emphasis added), with Jones I, 691 So. 2d at 482 (stating that Petitioner argued
"execution by electrocution [was] unconstitutionalperse") (emphasis added). The differences in
wording are subtle, yet marked. Thus, the exact language and consequent substance ofPetitioner's
argument remains unclear.
5. Jones,701 So. 2d at 76 n.l (stating that during the execution of [Pedro] Medina, "flames
were seen near the headpiece of the electric chair [as well as] smoke"). The trial judge
characterized these events as being the result of a rare "malfunction." See id. at 77 ("The
procedures used in the last seventeen Florida executions have been consistently followed, and no
malfunctions occurred until the execution of Pedro Medina.").
6. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3, cl.b (providing, generally, for the Supreme Court of
Florida's jurisdiction, including "all writs" jurisdiction as exercised here).
7. The Order staying Petitioner's execution was issued on April 10, 1997 and was to last
until 7 a.m. on April 18, 1998. See Jones 1,481 So. 2d at 482. The Jones Icourt granted the trial
court permission to extend the stay in the event that it were to "find by the greater weight of the
evidence that electrocution in Florida's electric chair in its present condition [was] cruel or
unusual punishment." Id.
8. The trial court that presided over Petitioner's postconviction proceedings was issued
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chair.9 Meanwhile, Petitioner's claim that electrocution was
"unconstitutional per se" was rejected on procedural grounds. ° After a
four-day hearing, the trial court denied Petitioner's claim that Florida's
electric chair was a form of "cruel and unusual punishment" because of its
present condition." On appeal, however, the Supreme Court of Florida
vacated the trial court's order and called for another hearing. 2 The second
hearing produced an adequate evidentiary record 3 and again resulted in the
denial of Petitioner's claim. 4 Petitioner appealed, raising several
objections."' The Supreme Court of Florida, however, rejected them in
toto, vacated Petitioner's stay of execution, and HELD, that electrocution
in Florida's electric chair in its present condition is not "cruel or unusual
punishment." 6
The United States Constitution generally empowers states to create and
enforce their own substantive and procedural criminal law. 7 While states
may not deny their citizens"8 federally guaranteed protections,' 9 they may

jurisdiction and ordered to conduct the evidentiary hearing in question. See Jones I, 691 So. 2d
at 482. Petitioner would later argue that the trial judge was personally biased against him,
presumably owing to the court's familiarity with Petitioner and his appeal. See Jones, 701 So. 2d
at 80. This argument, however, was swiftly rejected. See id.
9. See Jones 1, 691 So. 2d at 482 ("The [trial] court may receive the testimony of
engineering and medical experts and such other witnesses as may be presented by the parties, and
shall make its decision as expeditiously as possible.").
10. Id. The Jones I court added, however, that it would have denied Petitioner's claim "even
if [it] were not procedurally barred." Id.
11. Jones v. Butterworth, 695 So. 2d 679, 680 (Fla. 1997) (per curiam) [hereinafterJones
II.
12. See id. at 680-81. A second hearing was held in order to accommodate more evidence
and testimony. See id. Hence, the second hearing was intended to encompass the evidence and
testimony presented at the first hearing, as well. See id. The Supreme Court of Florida,
relinquishing jurisdiction for the second time to the same trial court, emphatically stated the
purpose of the new hearing: "We reiterate that the sole issue to be determined is whether or not
electrocution in Florida's electric chair in its present condition is cruel or unusual punishment."
Id.
13. See Jones, 701 So. 2d at 80 ("There is [now] competent substantial evidence in the
record to support the order of the trial judge.").
14. See id. (stating that the "trial judge entered a twenty-six page final order denying
[Petitioner's] claim that Florida's electric chair in its present condition was unconstitutional")
(emphasis added).
15. See id. at 78-80. Altogether, Petitioner raised seven points on appeal. See id.
16. Id. at 80.
17. See generally,e.g., Louisiana ex rel.Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459,466-70 (1947)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (providing a useful and comprehensive discussion of the United
States's federalist concept of criminal justice, whereby states enjoy a monitored freedom to "carry
out their own notions of criminal justice"); cf. Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 961 (Fla. 1992)
("[S]tate courts and constitutions have traditionally served as the prime protectors oftheir citizens'
basic freedoms.").
18. SeeU.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("AllpersonsbornornaturalizedintheUnitedStates,
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elect to expand those protections or establish new ones. 20 Thus, a state's
interpretation of its own constitution is controlling unless it fails to satisfy
the minimum guarantees of the United States Constitution.21
Based on these federalist principles, states may generally impose death
sentences and perform executions without running afoul of the United
States Constitution.' Nevertheless, federal courts have jurisdiction when
a particular method' or proposed instance24 of capital punishment is
challenged on federal constitutional grounds. 25 An early case featuring a
federally based challenge against a state court's decision to uphold
execution under its own constitution was In re Kemmler.26
In Kemmler, the United States Supreme Court reviewed a decision of
the Court of Appeals of New York27 upholding a death sentence under the
New York Constitution.28 When Kemmler was decided, the New York

and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person within its
jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.")
19. See generally Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 961 ("Under our federalist system of government,
states may ... not.. . place more restrictions on the fundamental rights of their citizens than the
federal Constitution permits." (citing PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980)).
20. See, e.g., id. ("[S]tates may place more rigorous restraints on government intrusion than
the federal charter imposes .... ).
21. SeeResweber, 329 U.S. at461-62 ("For matters ofstate law, the opinion... of[a state's
highest court is] binding on this court.") (citation omitted).
22. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,169 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("[W]e... hold that
the punishment of death does not invariably violate the Constitution.").
23. See, e.g., Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301, 309 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that execution by
lethal injection in California was unconstitutional pursuant to the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution); Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 1994)
(en bane) (holding that execution by hanging in Washington did not violate the United States
Constitution).
24. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (five to four decision) (reversing
the Supreme Court of Florida's decision to allow the execution of an inmate who did not
personally kill or attempt to kill anyone).
25. See generally,e.g., Kristina E. Beard, Comment, Five Under the Eighth:Methodology
Reviewandthe CruelandUnusualPunishments
Clause,51 U. MAMI L. REV. 445,466-80 (1997)
(providing a useful overview of several recent federal cases).
26. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
27. The Court ofAppeals of the State of New York is thatjurisdiction's court of last resort.
See id. at 438 (stating that "[a] writ of error to the highest court of a State is not allowed as a
matter of right") (emphasis added).
28. See id. at 442. The county judge, upon reviewing the original writ, was only concerned
with the New York Constitution. See id. The judge's rationale was that the Eighth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, which was, "in language almost identical to the New York
Constitution," did not apply to "punishments inflicted in state courts for crimes against the State."
Id. See also, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, IsElectrocutionan UnconstitutionallMethodofExecution?
The Engineering of Death Over the Century, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 551, 597-98 (1994).
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Constitution proscribed the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishment,
hence adopting the conjunctive language of the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.3" Still, New York courts, prior to the Kemmler
Court's acceptance of certiorari, decided to address the concepts of"cruel"
and "unusual" separately. 3 ' This approach provided the courts with an
opportunity to comment on the unusualness of electrocution as a method
of execution and determine what legal significance, if any, attached to such
a factual determination. 2
The Court of Appeals of New York conceded that electrocution might
be considered "unusual" because it was technologically new. 33 It rejected,
however, the argument that electrocution was "cruel," and thus upheld the
validity of electrocution under the New York Constitution. 34 In turn, the
Kemmler Court found that New York's decision, based entirely on its own
constitution, did not encroach upon any protections afforded by the
Fourteenth Amendment 35 to the United States Constitution. 36
A century after the Court of Appeals of New York ruled that executions
by electrocution did not violate its state constitution, the Supreme Court of
Florida, in Buenoano v. State,37 could have reached the same conclusion
under its own constitution.38 In Buenoano, an inmate sentenced to die in
Florida's electric chair 9 challenged the constitutionality of her anticipated
punishment based on the device's malfunction in a recent execution.4" The

According to Professor Denno, Kemmler's holding that the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution did not apply to the states was "overruled decades later in Robinson v.
California[,370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962),] which incorporated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
29. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 5.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (providing, in relevant part, that "cruel and unusual
punishments [shall not be] inflicted"); see Kemnmler, 136 U.S. at 445.
31. See Kenmler, 136 U.S. at 447. The Kemmler Court implied that all of the New York
state courts that reviewed the appeal reached the same conclusion. See id. (referring simply to
"[t]he courts of New York").
32. See id.
33. Id. (dictum).
34. Id.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing, in relevant part, that "[n]o state shall...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law").
36. See Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447-48.
37. 565 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam) (four to three decision).
38. See id. at 311 (stating that "[d]eath by electrocution is not cruel and unusual
punishment," thereby using the language of the United States Constitution).
39. See id. at 310.
40. See id.("The crux ofBuenoano's present claim relates to the circumstances surrounding
the recent execution of Jesse Tafero... [, during which] smoke and flames instantaneously
spurted from [Tafero's] head for a distance of as much as twelve inches."). In fact, Tafero was
subjected to three discrete "jolt[s]" of electricity for fear that the initial two had not resulted in
his death. See id. For a narrative account ofTafero's execution, see Denno, supranote 28, at 554-
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inmate claimed in her petition that the Florida Department of Corrections
was not competent to execute her because it had failed to remedy the
inadequacies of the electric chair."'
The Supreme Court of Florida denied the claim and ruled that an
evidentiary hearing was unnecessary because the Florida Department of
Corrections had already determined that it could properly perform
executions.42 Thus, the Buenoano court did not perceive a judicial issue,
but rather, an executive one.' Further, the Buenoano court was satisfied
that the matter had already been resolved.'
The Buenoano court reinforced its holding by citing a United States
Supreme Court case decided under the Eight. Amendment.45 Yet, the
Supreme Court of Florida did not cite any Florida case law. 46 Although
Buenoano upheld the constitutionality of execution in Florida's electric
chair, it did not specify whether it was referring to the Florida Constitution,
the United States Constitution, or both.
Earlier, the majority had used the phrase "cruel and unusual
punishment," thereby invoking the language found in the United States
Constitution.47 Thus, Buenoano's imprecision was furthered by Justice
Shaw's dissent." In his dissent, Justice Shaw remarked that executions in
Florida must be administered in a fashion that is "neither cruel nor unusual,"
thereby invoking the disjunctive language of the Florida Constitution.49
In Tillman v. State,5" the Supreme Court of Florida specifically called
attention to the Florida Constitution's mutually exclusive prohibitions
57.
41. SeeBuenoano, 565 So. 2d at 311. Buenoano argued, specifically, that "the Department

ofCorrections [was] 'incompetent to carry out executions' because it had not replaced the electric
chair's "'homemade"' electrode such that she, like Tafero, would be subjected to a "slow death."
Id. Buenoano argued that the electrode in question was not capable of conducting enough

electricity to ensure a constitutional execution. See id.
42. TheBuenoanocourt determined that the "irregularities" attaching to Tafero's execution
were the result of a synthetic sponge, which should not have been used. See id.
43. See id. The Florida Department of Corrections is the province of the state's executive

branch of government. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id. (citing Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947)). The
Francis Court determined that, following a failed execution attempt due to an "unforeseeable
accident," an inmate could be subjected to a second execution attempt by the same means. See

Francis,329 U.S. at 464 (stating that "[t]he cruelty against which the Constitution protects a
convicted man [sic] is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering
involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely") (dictum). The method used in the
failed attempt was electrocution, via Louisiana's electric chair. See id. at 460.
46. See Buenoano, 565 So. 2d at 311.

47. Id.
48. See id. at 311-12 (Shaw, J., dissenting).

49. See id. at 312 (Shaw, 3., dissenting).
50. 591 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1992) (unanimous decision).
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against "cruel punishment" and "unusual punishment," thus avoiding the
Buenoano court's imprecision."1 In Tillman, the appellant, a parolee, had
pled guilty to a charge upon the State's agreement to withhold evidence
during the penalty phase that would establish aggravating circumstances. 2
But the State breached its end of the bargain and the appellant was
sentenced to death. 3 Upon remand, the appellant presented mitigating
circumstances.5 4 Still, a jury voted eight to four to impose the death
penalty,55 hence giving rise to the Tillman court's so-called
"'proportionality review. ' "'56
In short, the expression "proportionality review" refers to the
appropriateness of a death sentence vis-i-vis the nature and circumstances
of a particular conviction." The Tillman court, for example, determined
that it would be "'unusual"' to execute the appellant in view of his
mitigating evidence."5 The Tillman court reached this conclusion by means
of a comparative analysis. That is, the Tillman court prioritized the fact that
other courts had "deemed [the death penalty] improper" in response to
similar factual predicates.5 9 In turn, the appellant's death sentence was
commuted in order to comport with the Florida Constitution's independent
prohibition against "unusual punishment."'
In the instant case, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the trial
court's refusal to admit and consider evidence regarding the unusualness of
Petitioner's anticipated execution."' The instant court found that the
exclusion of this evidence was proper in light of Supreme Court of Florida
precedent which held that execution by electrocution was not "per se
unconstitutional."' 2 Having rejected Petitioner's claim, the instant court
deferred to both a Ninth Circuit opinion 3 and a Fourth Circuit opinion" for
reinforcement, but did not invoke Florida law."5
51. Id. at 169 n.2 (stating that "[t]he use of the word 'or' [in the phrase 'cruel or unusual
punishment' in article 1, section 17 of the Florida Constitution] indicates that alternatives were
intended").
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 168-69.
55. See id. at 168.
56. Id. at 169.
57. See id.
58. Id.
59. Id. (citations omitted).
60. See id. The appellant's death sentence was reduced to life in prison without the
possibility of parole for 25 years. See id.
61. See Jones v. State, 701 So. 2d 76, 79 (Fla. 1997).
62. Id. (citing Medina v. State, 690 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 1997)).
63. See id. (citing Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 682 (9th Cir. 1994).
64. See id. (citing Hunt v. Nuth, 57 F.3d at 1327, 1338 (4th Cir. 1995).
65. See id.
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The instant court's wholesale rejection ofPetitioner's argument on the
basis of Florida precedent and federal case law was complicated by Justice
Shaw's dissent." Emphasizing the importance of federalist principles,
Justice Shaw argued that the Supreme Court ofFlorida should look first to
the Florida Constitution when deciding matters that pertain to fundamental
individual rights.6' According to Justice Shaw, the need to consult the
United States Constitution is obviated once a government action has been
declared infirm under the Florida Constitution.68
In his dissent, Justice Shaw cited federal case law.69 Unlike the majority
and Justice Harding, who concurred separately, Justice Shaw used federal
authority to delineate the outer limits of permissible punishment under the
United States Constitution."0 Hence, Justice Shaw did not rely on federal
case law to elucidate the Florida Constitution's prohibition against "cruel
or unusual punishments.' In turn, Justice Shaw, having distinguished the
Florida Constitution from the United States Constitution, suggested that the
Florida Constitution prohibits methods of execution that are "unusual,"
regardless of whether they are "cruel." ' 2
Petitioner claimed that his execution would be "unusual" under the
Florida Constitution based on comparative evidence.73 Specifically,
Petitioner intended to establish that other jurisdictions had abandoned
electrocution in favor of other execution methods.7 4 According to

66. See id. at 82-88 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
67. See id.at 83 (Shaw, J., dissenting) ("When called upon to decide matters offundamental
rights, Florida's state courts are bound under federalist principles to give primacy to our state
Constitution and to give independent legal import to every phrase and clause contained therein."
(quoting Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 962 (Fla. 1992))).
68. See id. (Shaw, J., dissenting) ("If a government practice fails under the Florida
Constitution, nofurtheranalysis is needed under the federal charter.").
69. See id. (Shaw, J., dissenting).
70. See id. (Shaw, J., dissenting) (using the expression "constitutional floor" (citing
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459,464 (1947)).
71. Id. n.15 (Shaw, J., dissenting) (distinguishing the Florida Constitution's prohibition
against "cruel or unusual punishments" from the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the
United States Constitution by citing two Florida cases that draw key distinctions thereunto,
namely, Allen v. State, 636 So. 2d 494, 497 n.5 (Fla. 1994) and Tillman v. State, 591 So. 2d 167,
169 n.2 (Fla. 1992)).
72. Id. at 83 (Shaw, J., dissenting) ("Significantly, the framers of article I, section 17 of the
Florida Constitution articulated the 'cruel orunusual' prohibition in the alternative, and this Court
has always given the prohibition a literal interpretation .... "). Justice Shaw then went on to
clarify his point: "[The prohibition contains no limiting language and, by its plain words, bars
punishments that are cruel or unusual in any manner." Id. (emphasis added). See also id. at 84
(Shaw, J., dissenting) ("[I]f the Florida prohibition [against cruel or unusual punishment] is to
have any meaning, it must at a minimum bar any punishment that is impermissibly cruel... as
well as any punishment that is unusual.").
73. Id. at 79.
74. See id. Petitioner argued "there is a trend away from execution through the use of the
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Petitioner, Florida was one of only six jurisdictions in the United States still
using the electric chair during the pendency of his appeal.75
While Petitioner's definition of "unusual" was in line with Justice
Shaw's,76 it was different from Justice Anstead's.77 In order to define
"unusual," Justice Shaw consulted a regular dictionary and applied the
word's plain meaning.7" Justice Anstead, however, in a separate dissent,
suggested that "unusual" in its present context also" referred to
punishments that invoked "the dark ages and horror stories."" By this,
Justice Anstead suggested that evolving standards of civility could render
a particular method of punishment "unusual."'" Adopting an originalist
approach to constitutional interpretation, Justice Anstead further implied
that electrocution was an "unusual" form of punishment simply because it
was not in existence when the relevant portions
of the Florida Constitution
82
and United States Constitution were drafted.
Apart from being nonconformist, Justice Anstead's interpretation of
"unusual" was also nonexclusive." That is, it referred to both the Florida
and United States Constitution." Moreover, Justice Shaw indicated that his
interpretive approach toward the provision was only meant to be helpful,
not conclusory.8 5 Thus, instead of collaborating on a singular and cohesive
definition of "unusual," pursuant to the Florida Constitution, Justice Shaw
and Justice Anstead instead offered competing and somewhat conflicting
interpretations.
The instant court differentiated the Florida Constitution from the United
States Constitution by indicating that Petitioner sought protection under

electric chair." Id.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 85 (Shaw, J., dissenting).

77. See id. at 88-89 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
78. See id. at 85 n.22 (Shaw, J., dissenting) (quoting

WEBSTER'S THMD NEW

INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2514 (4th ed. 1976)).

79. Justice Anstead did not reject Justice Shaw's definition, but merely expanded on it. See

id. at 89 (Anstead, 3., dissenting).
80. Id. (Anstead, J., dissenting).
81. See id. (Anstead, J., dissenting) (referring to "civilized society" vis-A-vis the "21st
century").
82. See id. (Anstead, J., dissenting) ("[Ilt is also apparent that the drafters ofthe 'cruel and
unusual' and 'cruel or unusual' provisions in our federal and state constitutions, would ... have
found the electric chair unusual because ofits later invention .... ") (emphasis added).
83. See id. (Anstead, J., dissenting) (referring to "the 'unusual' part of thefederalandstate

constitutional limitations" on punishment) (emphasis added).
84. See id. (Anstead, J., dissenting) (referring to both the "drafters ofthe 'cruel and unusual'
and 'cruel or unusual' provisions. . . [of] our state and federal constitutions").
85. See id. at 85 (Shaw, J., dissenting) ("While I would find lack of approval in a majority

ofjurisdictions a strong indicator that a method is impermissibly unusual, I recognize that this is
not dispositive but rather is simply one factor-albeit a significant one-to be considered.").
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both." By using the expression "unconstitutional" without modifying it,87
however, and freely alternating between the conjunctive language of the
United States Constitution and the disjunctive language of the Florida
Constitution,"8 the instant court proceeded to collapse this distinction. The
instant court ignored basic federalist principles by failing to apply the
Florida Constitution before the United States Constitution. 9
By disregarding the Florida Constitution's independent prohibition
against "unusual punishment," the instant court diminished Petitioner's
chances for a successful appeal. The plain language of the Florida
Constitution proscribes "unusual punishment."" Yet there is little in
Florida's case law to give the phrase "unusual punishment" meaningful
content.9 Consequently, Petitioner's claim was rejected improvidently.
According to the instant court, Petitioner's claim was properly rejected
by the trial court because execution by electrocution is not "per se
unconstitutional."92 What remains unclear, though, is whether this
purportedly well-settled principle has ever been reached expressly under the
Florida Constitution. In Buenoano, for instance, the Supreme Court of
Florida stated that "death by electrocution is not cruel and unusual
punishment," thereby using the language found in the United States
Constitution.9'
Petitioner claimed that his punishment would be "unusual" because, as
a factual matter, electrocution was a comparatively rare method of
execution during the pendency of his appeal.94 Although the Tillman court
86. See id. at 77 (comparing the Florida Constitution's prohibition against "cruel orunusual
punishment" with the United States Constitution's prohibition against "cruel and unusual

punishment") (emphasis added). Justice Harding emphasized this distinction in his concurring
opinion, as well. See id. at 80 (Harding, J., concurring).
87. See id. at 77.
88. See, e.g., id.at 76-77 (using the expressions "cruel and unusual punishment"and "cruel

or unusual punishment" in the same paragraph, without explanation or modification).
89. See id. at 77. The trial judge concluded as a matter of law that "[c]ruel or unusual
punishment is defined by the [federal] Courts as the wanton infliction of unnecessary pain." Id.
(citations omitted).
90. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 17.
91. See infra text accompanying notes 94-97.
92. Jones, 701 So. 2d at 79.
93. Buenoano v. State, 565 So. 2d 309,311 (Fla. 1990) (emphasis added). Meanwhile, the
instant court cited another case, Medina v. State, 690 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 1997) (per curium), in

order to establish that executions in Florida's electric chair were not "per se unconstitutional."
Jones, 701 So. 2d at 79 n.3. Yet, the holding inMedina pertained to competency under the Florida
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and was therefore not on point. SeeMedina,690 So. 2d at 1242. The

case was further problematic because it used the phrase "cruel and/or unusual punishment" in its
procedural history section, thereby invoking a construction which is not found in either the
Florida, or the United States Constitution. Id. at 1244.
94. Jones, 701 So. 2d at 79 (stating that "only six states currently employ the electric chair

as a means of execution" during the pendency of Petitioner's appeal).
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gave the phrase "unusual punishment" content, it never contemplated
Petitioner's definition because it did not have to. 9 This suggests that
Petitioner's claim was one offirst impression. Although Justice Shaw96 and
Justice Anstead97 mentioned the Florida Constitution's prohibition against
"unusual punishment" in their dissents, neither invoked jurisdictional
precedent.98
Federal courts, meanwhile, have not been willing to proscribe a given
method of execution simply because it is comparatively rare.99 Kemmler is
a good illustration of this."' Hence, if "unusual punishments" are to be
designated as such on the basis of mere novelty and accordingly banned
under the Florida Constitution, Florida must establish its own case law to
support such a rule.
The instant case presented the Supreme Court of Florida with an
opportunity to expand and otherwise clarify the definition of "unusual
punishment" under the Florida Constitution.1"' Instead, by deferring to
federal case law, the instant court weakened the Florida Constitution. The
Tillman court's definition of"unusual punishment" created a gap inFlorida
case law because it pertained to proportionality review, not method of
execution review.0 2 By overlooking this gap, the instant court diminished
Petitioner's chances for a successful appeal. Furthermore, the instant court
disserved future petitioners by rendering the Florida Constitution's
independent prohibition against "unusual punishment" jurisprudentially
vacant.

95. Tillman v. State, 591 So. 2d 167, 169 (Fla. 1992).
96. See Jones, 701 So. 2d at 82-88 (Shaw, J., dissenting).

97. See id. at 88-89 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
98. See, e.g., id. at 87 (Shaw, J.,
dissenting). Justice Shaw's engaging description of the
FloridaElectric Chair, for instance, as something "befitting the laboratory ofBaronFrankenstein,"
was not supported by any precedent whatsoever.
99. See generally, e.g., Beard, Comment, supra note 25, at 460-79 (suggesting that

contemporary rarity alone is not a contestable issue under the United States Constitution).
100. See In reKemmler, 136 U.S. 436,447 (1890). Accord Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662,
682 (9th Cir. 1994) ("We cannot conclude that judicial hanging is incompatible with evolving

standards of decency simply because few states continue the practice.").
101. See Jones, 701 So. 2d at 79.
102. See id. at 84 n.17 (Shaw, J.,
dissenting) (using the phrase "method of execution").
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